Econophysics and the social sciences: Challenges and opportunities by Ormerod, P.
PERSPECTIVES
VOL. 76, NOS. 9–10 345
* Volterra Consulting, London; Dept of Anthropology, University of
Durham; Extreme Events in Human Behaviour Programme, IIASA,
Austria. E-mail : pormerod@volterra.co.uk
The current author, Ormerod, has extensive connections with
econophysics and was invited in the original list, but as an
economist and not as an econophysicist.
a
Introduction
T
he discipline of econophysics is now some 15 years
old. The purpose of this article is to consider the
challenges which it faces in gaining broader
scientific acceptance in the social sciences and especially
within economics. First of all, however, we discuss briefly
some of the main successes of the discipline.
As noted in , the main area of activity for econophysics
has been financial markets, a natural area for physicists to
investigate given its terabytes of well defined time series
data. The evidence for the fat-tailed distribution of asset
price changes noted in has now been established beyond
doubt as a truly universal feature of financial markets. A
genuinely original and very important contribution of
econophysics, using the technique of random matrix theory,
has been the discovery that the empirical correlation matrix
of price changes of different assets or classes of assets is
very poorly determined for example]. This latter point
undermines Markowitz portfolio theory and the capital
asset pricing model, still regarded as powerful and valid
theories by many economists .
Another active area of empirical investigation for
econophysics has been industrial structure and its evolution.
As with financial markets, large amounts of generally
reliable data are available in this area, too. It should be said
that some of the econophysics literature is perhaps less
original and/or well established than physicists might
appreciate. Strong evidence on the right-skew distribution
of firm sizes, for example, has been both available and well
known in industrial economics for many years [ for
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example]. A more distinct finding by econophysicists is
that the variance of firm growth rates falls as firm size
increases, the seminal paper on this being .
But despite this impressive record, econophysics has
made little impact on the social sciences, even on
economics itself, the name of which discipline is of course
part of the 'econophysics' description.
An indication of this was given by the initial conference
of the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) held at
King's College Cambridge in April 2010 (the location was
symbolic, King's being the college of Keynes). INET is
sponsored by a $50 million donation over a five year period
by George Soros. A wide range of economists were invited,
but no econophysicist was on the list . The efforts which
the leading members of the community had to make to get a
s i n g l e p e r s o n i n v i t e d a r e d o c u m e n t e d a t
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics . Eventually, Doyne
Farmer was invited. But econophysics as a discipline has
clearly made very little impact on the thinking of
economists who realise that new intellectual approaches are
required.
It is important to stress from the outset that economics
has become very resistant to new ideas, especially those
from other disciplines. Much of this arises from the rules
of behaviour which agents are postulated to follow, a
crucial point which we also discuss further in section 5.
The point illustrated here, however, is the closed mind set
of many economists.
The dominant paradigm in macroeconomic theory, for
example, over the past 30 years has been that of rational
agents making optimal decisions under the assumption that
they form their expectations about the future rationally -
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the rational agent using rational expectations, or RARE for
short.
Rational expectations do not require that an agent's
predictions about the future are always correct. Indeed,
such predictions may turn out to be incorrect in every single
period, but still be rational. The requirement is that on
average over a long period of time, expectations are correct.
Agents are assumed to take into account all relevant
information, and to make predictions which are on average
unbiased. Deviations from perfect foresight in any given
period are an inherent feature of this behavioural postulate,
but such deviations can only be random. If there were any
systematic pattern to the deviations, the agent would be
assumed to incorporate the pattern into his or her
expectations. Again, on average over a long period, such
expectations are correct.
It will be apparent that the theory is difficult to falsify to
someone who really believes in its validity. Even the most
dramatic failure to predict the future, such as the 2008
financial crisis, can be explained away as a random error.
A rational expectations enthusiast can still continue to
maintain the correctness of the theory by simply assuming
that over some (theoretically indeterminate) period of time,
on average agents' expectations prove accurate.
An assumption of the theory is that, as part of the set of
information being processed, the agent is in possession of
correct model of the economy. Indeed, on the logic of
the theory itself, if the model being used to make
predictions were not correct, the forecasts would exhibit
some sort of bias, some systematic error, and agents would
realise that it was wrong.
It might reasonably be argued that it is difficult to
subscribe to the view that agents understand the correct
model of the economy given that economists themselves
differ in their views as to how the economy operates. For
example, in the autumn of 2008, many prominent American
economists, including a number of Nobel Prize winners,
vigorously opposed any form of bail-out of the financial
system, arguing that it was better to let banks fail. Others,
including decision makers at the Federal Reserve and
Treasury, took a different view entirely.
The response of the academic mainstream has been to
insist that there have been strong moves towards
convergence within the profession on opinions about
macroeconomic theory. By implication, anyone who takes
a different view and is not part of this intellectual
convergence is not really a proper economist.
For example, the American Economic Association
launched in January 2009 a new journal, .
the
Macroeconomics
It turns out that the academic profession believes it has
reached a broad consensus. The first issue carries an article
by one of the world's leading academic macroeconomists,
Michae l Woodford , en t i t l ed 'Convergence in
Macroeconomics: Elements of the New Synthesis’ .
The first and most important part of the new synthesis is
that 'it is now widely agreed that macroeconomic analysis
should employ models with coherent intertemporal general
equilibrium foundations'. Incredibly, Woodford's article
was published in January 2009. I suppose it was written at
some point during 2008, but even so the West as a whole
was already in recession in the middle of that year.
Olivier Blanchard is the chief economist of the
International Monetary Fund, and here is what he had to say
in August 2008 in an MIT working paper entitled 'The State
of Macro’ : 'For a long while after the explosion of
macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked like a
battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts do not
go away, a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of
methodology has emerged…… The state of macro is good.'
The state of macro is good ! In August 2008, just a few
weeks before the financial crisis almost brought capitalism
literally to a halt!
To be fair to Blanchard, he did then express some
reservations, but these were largely technical in nature, and
he did not challenge the fundamental idea of rational
equilibria. On the contrary, he concluded 'macroeconomics
is going through a period of great progress.’
On any reasonable scientific criteria, these models were
falsified by the financial crisis of 2008/09. Blanchard
himself conceded as much in a later paper . But for the
profession as a whole, these rational agent equilibrium
macroeconomic models are still highly regarded. One of
the sessions at the Cambridge INET conference, for
example, was mainly devoted to papers arguing that the
economic recession offered a great opportunity. The new
ranges explored by the data (i.e. the deepest recession in the
West since the 1930s) would, it was claimed, enable the
models to be developed and calibrated more accurately.
It is very hard in the face of such attitudes for different
approaches to gain any sort of traction with most
economists. Even the work of many Nobel Prize winners
economics itself is ignored by the mainstream, a
situation which is impossible to imagine within the
discipline of physics.
For example, the prize in 2000 was awarded to the
micro econometricians Heckman and McFadden. Heckman
in his Prize lecture states that ''an important empirical
regularity is the diversity and heterogeneity of behaviour
[of agents]'. Yet a great deal of mainstream theory still uses
the single 'representative' agent to proxy the behaviour of
the entire economy.
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A devastating mathematical critique of this concept was
provided over 20 years ago by Kirman
a
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Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith shared the prize in
2002, for their work in psychology and experimental
economics. Kahneman's summary of the entire corpus of
this empirical work is: 'humans reason poorly and act
intuitively’ . Yet as Smith points out : 'Within economics
there is essentially only one model to be adapted to every
application: optimization subject to constraints due to
resource limitations, institutional rules and /or the behavior
of others, as in Cournot-Nash equilibria'. And here is
Edmund Phelps, 2006 winner: 'After some neoclassical
years at the start of my career I began building models that
address modern phenomena. At Yale and at RAND, in part
through my teachers William Fellner and Thomas
Schelling, I gained some familiarity with the concepts of
Knightian uncertainty, Keynesian probabilities, Hayek's
private know-how and M. Polyáni's personal knowledge.’ .
Each of these concepts is diametrically opposed to the view
of the economic mainstream as to how the world operates.
So the lack of impact which econophysics has had
within economics is to a substantial degree due to the
attitudes of the economics profession itself.
This in turn has implications for the strategies to be
followed by econophysics in order to gain wider scientific
acceptance. Whilst there are some genuinely open minded
mainstream economists such as John Sutton at LSE and
Marcus Miller at Warwick (to name two prominent
academics in the UK context), in general it will be very
hard to get economics itself to take econophysics seriously.
The strategy of attempting to engage with economics
should not be ruled out, but it is unlikely to prove
successful.
Some of the reasons for the lack of a wider impact of
econophysics are the restrictions which much of the
discipline imposes on itself. These relate both to the nature
of the problem which are addressed and to the other
disciplines with which econophysics seeks to engage. In
this section, we discuss the former and return to the latter in
section 5.
As noted above, a great deal of the work by
econophysicists has focused on financial markets and
industrial structure. Both these areas are fortunate to have
very large data sets containing reliable data. Although such
data are not the outcomes of controlled experiments, in
terms of their quality and quantity they resemble the type of
data to which physicists are accustomed.
The development of information technology is
expanding the areas in which such data can be found, the
structure of the Internet and the various social networking
sites being obvious examples.
16 17
18
Self-imposed Restrictions of Econophysics
But most data in economics, and indeed more generally
in the social sciences, is simply not like this at all. The data
series are short and contain substantial amounts of noise. In
general, the data are not collected for the purposes of
scientific analysis, but are often the by-products of
government activity. So, for example, estimates of GDP,
the total output of an economy, are built up from literally
hundreds of different sources. Some are reasonably
reliable, such as the net amount of Value Added Tax on
consumer purchases, which can be used to derive estimates
of the amount of spending in those sectors of the economy
where the tax is applicable. Even here, there may be
problems in sectors, especially those involving drugs such
as tobacco and alcohol, because of tax evasion. Others,
such as estimates of the self-employed, may be more
difficult to estimate reliably. Yet others, such as measuring
the output of the non-traded public sector such as defence,
rely upon rather arbitrary accounting conventions. An idea
of the complications involved in constructing estimates of
national economic data, even for a sophisticated developed
economy such as the UK, can be obtained from .
There will also typically be only a small number of
observations by scientific standards. Continuing to use the
example of GDP, until the mid-19 century most Western
countries were still dominated by the agricultural sector
which had been the main sector since time immemorial. It
was only during the second half of that century somewhat
earlier for the small number of countries such as the UK
and the Netherlands that they came to have the
characteristics of modern developed economies. An
enormous amount of work has gone into constructing
estimates of GDP for Western economies back into the 19
century (for example ), but we have at most 150 annual
observations. It is not possible to obtain anymore.
It is perfectly reasonable for an individual
econophysicist to decide that he or she does not wish to
work with data of this nature. But this limits rather sharply
the social and economic issues which can be analysed.
Again, the areas where large amounts of reliable data are
available are expanding, but this is not yet the case with
many problems which are of interest to economists.
As the recent crisis has shown so clearly, financial
markets are important. Further, apart from the scientific
attraction of being able to work with huge amounts of high
quality data, there has undoubtedly been the lure for
econophysicists of the possibility of making substantial
amounts of money by analyzing these markets. There is
absolutely nothing wrong with this motive. But it is hard
for econophysicists to appreciate that the detailed kind of
analysis which they carry out is seen within the discipline
of economics as a rather specialized activity. Many
students can graduate from top universities without having
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taken a course in 'financial economics', which may in any
event be something which the economics faculty has simply
hived off to the business school.
Economics deals with a very wide range of human
activities. For example, following the seminal work of
Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker in the 1960s and 70s,
economics now presumes to investigate social issues such
as racial discrimination, crime, family structures and drug
addiction. It is obviously impractical to list the entire set of
areas which are of interest to economists, but the
investigations of much of econophysics are confined to a
tiny subset.
But for illustration I offer two very difficult problems
where I believe econophysics can make a real contribution.
Within macroeconomics the study of the economic system
at the aggregate level there are two features of the market-
oriented developed economies which distinguish them from
all previously existing societies. Both of these are
understood at best poorly by mainstream economics.
First, the slow but steady growth in output over time
which averages between 2 to 3 per cent a year per head of
population. It is this long-run growth in particular which
distinguishes capitalism from all other forms of social and
economic organisation in human history.
Second, the persistent short-term fluctuations in output
around this underlying slow growth. From time to time,
these fluctuations are severe and output actually falls for a
period of time, before growth is resumed. The chart below
plots annual GDP growth in the UK since 1900. It is
entirely typical of the Western economies.
Rather confusingly to physicists, economists often refer
to these fluctuations as the 'business cycle'. The data do not
obviously follow a cyclical pattern, and this is simply the
descriptive term used within economics for these short-term
fluctuations.
Given that these fluctuations are persistent both over
time and across countries, they represent a serious
challenge to a view of the world based on the concept of
equilibrium. Further, they are at present a hot topic, given
the falls in output which took place across the West in 2009.
Econometrics essentially attempts to replicate the
history of series like this, fitting n-dimensional planes to the
data and a set of variables which purport to explain it. But
this is literally mere 'curve fitting' and lacks scientific
foundations.
Models are needed which are based on the actions of
agents from which empirical features of the system as a
whole emerge, exactly the approach of econophysics.
Factors to be reconciled with the model include the
properties of the data in the time and frequency domains,
the distributions of the size and duration of recessions, the
wait time between recessions (see for example for some
general features of Western economic recessions)
In 2006, with a group of economists sympathetic to
econophysics, I published a paper entitled 'Worrying Trends
in Econophysics’ . Although some econophysicists
interpreted it as an attack on econophysics, this was not our
intention at all. We stressed in the paper the achievements
of econophysics and our admiration for the open-minded
way in which the discipline addressed problems. We were
observing econophysics as economists who realise that a
profound paradigm shift is needed in economics, and
suggesting ways in which econophysics could become
more effective.
In general, the worries we
expressed remain valid and there is no
point repeating them in full here. One
point we made, however, is that
economics is not a completely empty
box, and a familiarity with some
economic theory would be useful to
any econophysicist seeking to break
out of the world of financial markets.
The work, for example, of Zhang and
his colleagues and associates at
Fribourg shows how strikingly original
work can be carried out in areas at the
heart of economics (to take just one
example, ), but for which knowledge
of existing economic theory is an
essential prerequisite.
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There are two related points which are worth
emphasising. From a purely tactical standpoint in terms of
gaining a wider audience receptive to econophysics, these
do act as a deterrent to economists who are at least willing
in principle to examine the work of econophysicists.
Physics as a discipline does not require a great deal of
knowledge of statistical theory. A theory is developed.
Experiments are carried out to see if it conforms to the
evidence. Both the theory and the experiments may present
formidable intellectual challenges. But in general, once the
experiments are carried out and the discipline is satisfied
with how they are done, it is obvious if the theory is wrong.
The results of the experiments do not usually require
refined statistical analysis in order to confirm this.
The situation is quite different in the social sciences.
Social science is not in the position of Einstein who, when
asked what he would think if observations failed to confirm
his prediction on the perihelion of Mercury, said, 'I shall be
very surprised'. In social and economic science we have
difficulty judging whether results of observations are
surprising or not. In part this relates to the small sample
noisy data discussed above, in part to the non-replicability
of events actually observed in the human world.
As a result of this, many social scientists have extensive
training in statistical theory. As it happens, there are many
more issues in the social sciences which sophisticated
statistical analysis has failed to resolve than there are which
it has succeeded. The point being made here is a subtle
one. Statistical analysis has shown itself to have serious
limitations in resolving problems in the social sciences.
But the knowledge which many social scientists have of
statistics means that they tend to be dismissive of any work
in which contains statistical analysis which is not very
sophisticated.
By far the most notorious example of this is the
tendency for econophysicists to publish papers which claim
to have discovered empirical power laws. There are
certainly examples where this is valid. But there are far too
many papers in which this claimed relationship is, to a
trained statistician, obviously not true.
Perline offers a detailed critique of the claim that
power laws characterise many data sets in the social
sciences. I recommend this article very highly to
econophysicists. He notes that findings are often
represented as though data conformed to a power law form
for all ranges of the variable of interest. Perline refers to
this ideal case as a inverse power law (SIPL).
However, many of the examples used by Pareto and Zipf, as
well as others who have followed them, have been
truncated data sets, and if one looks more carefully in the
lower range of values that was originally excluded, the
23
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power law behavior usually breaks down at some point.
This breakdown seems to fall into two broad cases, which
Perline calls here and inverse power laws (WIPL
and FIPL). WIPL refers to the situation where the sample
data fit a distribution that has an approximate inverse power
form only in some upper range of values. FIPL refers to the
situation where a highly truncated sample from certain
right-skew (and in particular, “lognormal-like”)
distributions can convincingly mimic a power law. His
paper shows that the discovery of ParetoZipf-type laws is
closely associated with truncated data sets. Further, through
detailed analysis of some reported results, he concludes that
many, but not all, ParetoZipf examples are likely to be FIPL
finite mixture distributions and that there are few genuine
instances of SIPLs.
The problems of truncation in data sets are particularly
acute. For example, as Perline observes 'it is in the nature
of things the low end, or very commonly, all but the upper
tail, of many kinds of data is hidden because of definitional
fuzziness and the difficulties associated with measurement
below some threshold. At the same time, it is frequently the
high end that is most important or most likely to capture our
attention'.
The second main point in this section is closely
connected to the above. Power laws have an important
status in the physical sciences, and so it is natural that
econophysicists should try and discover them in the human
world. However, for social scientists power laws have no
special significance. They are one of a number of non-
Gaussian distributions. And it is the distinction between
Gaussian and non-Gaussian which the social scientist
regards as important, not whether a non-Gaussian
distribution is of one particular form rather than another.
The constant attempt to represent data as conforming to
a power law does a considerable disservice to econophysics
in terms of it being taken seriously by social scientists, and
especially by economists. The discovery that non-Gaussian
outcomes are 'normal' rather than the Gaussian is of
enormous importance. But social scientists may disregard
such findings if these outcomes are invariably claimed to be
power laws, especially when by simple inspection they are
obviously not.
The fundamental building block in economics is the
agent. The agent is usually an individual, but the word is
applied to the decision making unit in the context which is
being analysed, so 'agent' can also mean a company, an
institution such as a regulator or a government, or even a
whole country.
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The standard economic approach ascribes considerable
intelligence to agents in the decision making process, both
in terms of the information they gather and the rules they
use to process it. The 'null model' of agent behavior in
economics is that of the rational agent, which is assumed to
have complete information about the decisions which need
to be made, and makes the optimal choice given the agent's
(fixed) tastes and preferences.
This may be modified by assuming some or all of the
agents have incomplete information (for example ). But
even in these situations, the decision making rule is still
based upon the principle of maximizing, i.e. taking the
optimal decision on the basis of the information available.
The agents in such contexts are usually described as being
'boundedly rational', but the bounds relate to the amount of
information which they have rather than to their decision
making rule given their information. Great store is also set
in economics on agents gradually being able to learn
optimal behavior.
The most important challenge to this approach comes
when decisions do not depend not on omniscient cost-
benefit analysis of isolated agents with fixed tastes and
preferences, but when the decision of any given agent
depends in part directly on what other actors are doing. In
such situations, which are probably the norm rather than the
exception in social settings, not only do choices involve
many options for which costs and benefits would be
impossible to calculate (e.g., what friends to keep, what job
to pursue, what game to play, etc.), but the preferences of
agents themselves evolve over time in the light of what
others do.
In complete contrast to economics, the 'null model' of
econophysics is the particle model of agent behaviour.
Particles of course act at random, by definition cannot act
with purpose or intent, and cannot learn. It is rather
literally a 'null model', deliberately assuming as little as
possible, in order to identify the most general
characteristics of collective human behavior.
This contrast gives rise to a massive gulf between
economics and econophysics. On the one hand, in
economics the null model of agent behavior assumes
complete rationality and optimizing behavior, which is then
modified to make it more realistic by restricting the set of
information which is available. On the other, in
econophysics the null model assumes literally zero
intelligence, a postulate which can then be modified by
giving agents limited abilities to gather and process
information.
An important example of 'close to zero intelligence'
behavior is copying, or, to give it a more refined
24
description, social learning. The phenomenon of 'social
learning' learning through observation or interaction with
other individuals - occurs widely in various forms in the
animal kingdom . Natural selection is now believed to
favour social learning strategies, mechanisms that specify
when agents copy and who they copy .
There is in fact a large body of evidence to suggest that
agent behaviour in many social and economic contexts is
much closer to the null model of econophysics than it is to
that of economics. Much of the literature in other social
sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology
suggests that this is the case. With anthropologist Alex
Bentley, I have a lengthy paper in press on the various
modifications to the 'particle model' of econophysics which
might prove useful, and which also contains more evidence
for the assertion that behavioural models in which agents
have highly imperfect knowledge and processing abilities
often have more realistic bases than the behavioural models
of economics.
The implication of the above is that there is a
fundamental difference of view between economics and
econophysics on the fundamental building block of
economics, namely agent behaviour. It is this which acts as
a real barrier to acceptance of econophysics models more
generally within economics itself.
There are other areas in the social sciences which are
much more amenable to the general approach of
econophysics. The European Social Simulation
Association and the Computational Social Simulation
Society in particular are organisations many of whose
members are sympathetic to models in which agents follow
relatively simple rules of behaviour. Their primary focus is
sociological, but many interesting issues are social rather
than economic. More generally, there is interesting agent
based modelling taking place in both anthropology and
geography, where there are many important questions to
analyse. The International Association for Research in
Economic Psychology and the Society for the
Advancement of Behavioral Economics have as their
primary focus the empirical analysis of actual behaviour,
rather than the a priori theorising which characterises much
of economics. But valuable insights on the rules to be used
for agent behaviour could be obtained by econophysics
liaising with these groups.
In short, there are many other social sciences to which
the methodology of econophysics can more easily relate
than it can to economics. But in order to develop
meaningful scientific collaborations, econophysicists will
have to make an effort to find out the interesting work
which has been done in these areas.
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